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An Analysis of Risk-Taking Behavior for Public Defined Benefit Pension Plans
1.

Introduction
Public pension plans play an important role in the financial market. By 2008, their

investments exceeded 6 percent of total financial assets, with aggregate assets of more
than $2.5 trillion. 1 These plans, which are mostly defined benefit (DB) plans, cover
pension benefits for 12.8 million active public employees and 5.9 million retirees and
other annuitants. 2 Despite their size, the plans appear to be underfunded. The Pew Center
on the States reports a $1.26 trillion shortfall for the fiscal year ending in 2009, a 26
percent increase from the prior year. 3 Other researchers argue for more conservative
accounting of promised benefits, which could further raise the shortfall estimate. NovyMarx and Rauh (2010) suggest that the dollar value gap of “already promised” benefits
over asset value is between $1.27 and $3.26 trillion. This means that each tax-paying
household would need to contribute an additional $21,500 to fully fund the obligation
(Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009). 4 Rauh (2010) estimates that the existing unfunded pension
debt would exhaust assets, in aggregate, by the year 2028. However, several funds would
run out much sooner. For example, Illinois would run out of pension fund assets in 2018,
and during the next year Connecticut, Indiana, and New Jersey would follow suit (Rauh
2010). The effect of underfunded pensions touches a large percentage of the population,
including not only those at risk but also the taxpayers who may be called upon to close
the funding gap.
The severe funding gap prompts questions of why the underfunding occurred and
whether the pension fund administrators will adopt riskier investment positions in the
hope of raising returns and lowering the shortfall. In this study we provide some
explanation for the first question; however, we focus our research on risk-taking
behavior. In particular, using data from the Public Plans Database maintained by the
1

The numbers are from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States dated September 17, 2009, put out by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington, D.C.
2
Source: The National Association of State Retirement Administration’s Web site, http://www.nasra.org.
3
“The Widening Gap: The Great Recession’s Impact on State Pension and Retiree Health Care Costs,”
April 2011, available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Pew_pensions_
retiree_benefits.pdf. The figure cited includes both pension and health care costs.
4
The $21,500 figure is calculated by using the number of households filing tax returns for 2008 (NovyMarx and Rauh 2009).
1

Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, we investigate the determinants of
pension risk-taking behavior during the period 2001 through 2009 after taking into
consideration state government incentives, political pressure, fiscal constraints, and
workforce features. Our measures of investment risk include the percentage of total plan
assets invested in the equity markets and the pension plan asset beta (Jin, Merton, and
Bodie 2006). We offer evidence that government accounting standards strongly affect
risk-taking behavior, as most pension plans use higher return assumptions to discount
their pension liabilities. Unlike reported results for private pension plans (Rauh 2009),
results for public pension plans indicate public fund managers appear to take on more risk
if the plans are already underfunded and have had low investment returns in the previous
years, behavior consistent with risk-transfer or an intent to pass underfunded current
pension obligations on to future tax payers (Gold 2003). Similarly, there is some
evidence to support the hypothesis that state fiscal constraints are associated with higher
levels of pension fund risk. There also appears to be a herding effect in that plan
managers tend to follow the risk-investing behavior of CalPERS (California Public
Employees' Retirement System). Furthermore, the results offer mild support of a public
union effect—that is, in order to provide larger retirement benefits for unionized public
employees, the fund manager pursues a riskier investment allocation. Finally, we find
limited evidence that economically targeted investment policies are associated with lower
pension investment risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the
institutional background, providing a quick example of a DB plan and commenting on
government accounting standards. A literature review and presentation of hypotheses is
provided in Section 3. We summarize the data and empirical results in Section 4, and
offer conclusions in Section 5.
2.

Institutional background

2.1.

Example of defined benefit pension plan mechanics
To better understand the underfunding status of public pension funds, we first

provide a quick review of DB plan benefit mechanics. Typically, the retirement benefit is
a function of salary, years of service, and a benefit factor. For example, consider a DB
2

plan for teachers in which the benefit factor is 2.2 percent. Suppose a teacher retires after
30 years, at a peak salary of $70,000, and earns a retirement benefit of $46,200 (0.022 ×
30 × 70,000), with the duration of payments as the only unknown. State funding of this
retirement is considered to be a cost, or a part of the employee’s compensation. Thus,
each year the state recognizes the cost of employee benefits accrued (earned). Usually,
both employees and employers fund the pension obligations, so the state is partially
paying for the retirement obligation.

In Ohio, for example, members of the State

Teachers Retirement System (STRS) Fund contribute 10 percent of gross earnings to the
trust fund, while employers contribute an additional 14 percent. These contributions, plus
earnings from their investment during the employee’s working life, flow into the fund.
Returning to the example above, if a teacher starts with a starting salary of $34,206 and
receives annual raises of 2.5 percent, the lifetime contributions amount to $360,416. The
undiscounted value of retirement benefits (assuming the same 2.5 percent inflation and
30 years postretirement) is just over $2 million. The most recent five-year return for the
Ohio STRS was 2.69 percent; using this return for both investing and discounting
obligations provides a liability of more than $1.3 million, with invested assets of
$518,000 at the time of retirement. Clearly, the rate of return on investment and the
appropriate discount rate to apply to forecasted benefits are key actuarial assumptions.
2.2.

Pension effects from government accounting standards
From an accounting perspective, states are required to follow the guidelines

specified in Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 25 (GASB 25),
which “stipulates that states should make annual required contributions (ARC) to include
the cost of newly accrued benefits due to service and wage increases, amortized payments
to make up unfunded actual liabilities, and amortized payments to make up any actuarial
loss” (GASB 1994). 5 However, states do not always contribute sufficient funds to cover
the amortized unfunded liabilities and/or actuarial loss. According to the Pew Center on
the States, only 22 states fully funded their 2009 fiscal year pension obligations.
Although the average contribution of all states exceeded 90 percent, many states
contributed a small portion of the required contribution—e.g., 31 percent for

5

See, for example, Rauh (2010, p. 12).
3

Pennsylvania. 6 More states may experience difficulty meeting the required contribution
as the current level of underfunding increases the amortization burden part of the ARC.
Thus, a second problem is the states’ current inability to devote more of the budget
towards amortizing the underfunding.
Finally, GASB accounting standards have contributed to the problem on the
liability side. According to GASB 25, liabilities (retiree benefits) may be discounted at a
rate equal to the expected return on assets. Most plans assume 8 percent. 7

Lower

valuations for pension cost require lower ARCs. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010) believe
that the inappropriate matching of the expected return on the investment strategy to the
certainty of paying benefits is responsible for the current underfunding crisis. Stated
another way, stocks are risky, and although the long-term return is a historical 11.4
percent, there have been several periods of negative returns. The current financial crisis
deepened the deficit for state public employee DB plans; however, underfunding was
already a prevalent issue in 2005, when Wilshire Research reported two problems: 1) 94
percent of state retirement systems were underfunded and 2) average asset allocations
were skewed towards equity (67 percent equity, including real estate and private equity,
and 33 percent fixed income). GASB 25 thus provides an incentive that results in
underfunding and exposing the assets to high levels of market risk in order to minimize
the service costs. 8
In summary, academic researchers and industry practitioners are alerting the
public to the magnitude of the pension plan underfunding problem and are suggesting
various contributory causes. 9 Indeed, it appears that accounting and political influence
may provide managers with an incentive to allocate more funds to riskier assets.10
Anecdotal evidence from CalSTRS and CalPERS appear to support this projection. 11
6

These statistics are available on the center’s Web site: http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org.
This is from an asset allocation target of 60 percent equity, earning 11.4 percent, and 40 percent debt,
earning 3 percent. The weighted average of returns is about 8 percent (GASB 1994).
8
Although the ARC requires a payment for underfunding, the amount of underfunding is subject to an
amortization period of 30 years.
9
Other contributory factors, outside the scope of this research, include ill-timed benefit increases following
the large fund returns during the 1990s, and structural issues such as spiking pay or early retirement. See
The Trillion Dollar Gap: Underfunded State Retirement Systems and the Road to Reform, February 18,
2010, Pew Center on the States.
10
Munnell, Haverstick, Sass, and Aubry (2008) argue that because public funds use the “entry-age normal”
cost method, which front-loads pension expense, underfunding is not as severe as indicated by the media.
7

4

3.

Literature review and hypotheses
There is a rich history of research concerning private pension plans; however,

empirical study of public pension plans is more limited. This is due to data availability
problems as well as to the different orientation of issues. For example, the corporate
sponsor of private plans has to answer to shareholders and must comply with or follow
strict regulatory and accounting guidelines. Moreover, the PBGC (Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation) is available as a vehicle to insure bankrupt plans.

Theories

regarding corporate DB pension fund management include risk management (Rauh
2009), risk shifting (Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977), tax benefit (Black 1980; Tepper 1981),
and earnings management (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh 2006). In general, except for
risk management and risk shifting, these are not the research issues associated with public
DB plans. In this section we discuss potential hypotheses for explaining public pension
plan risk-taking behavior. We use pension plan asset beta or equity asset allocation
percentage as a proxy for public pension plan risk, the dependent variable that will be
used in the regression models. Appendix A contains a summary of various hypotheses,
related variables, and predicted signs for variable coefficients.
3.1.

Risk management
Several recent articles describe the inadequacy of funding (for DB plans) and

discuss the incentives state governments harbor that have led to the current high levels of
underfunding (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009, 2010; Rauh 2010; Bonafede, Foresti, and
Yang 2005). As a consequence of the underfunding, many states and municipalities are
reducing services—that is, a greater percentage of their budget must be used for
payments into pension funds. This evidence suggests that one incentive both private and
public DB funds may have in common is risk management. Unexpected increases in
required funding for pension contributions may reduce the ability to invest in capital
expenditures because, in the short run, the state/municipal budget is fixed. For states,
They support the 80 percent funding benchmark as acceptable for public plans. They argue that the true
menace to state budgets is unfunded health care liability.
11
During 2009, both CalSTRS (California State Teachers' Retirement System) and CalPERS announced a
shift in investment policy. CalSTRS will shift some investment funding from stock to high-yield debt and
underpriced assets being held by banks and expects to earn 15 percent on this category. CalPERS loosened
asset allocation and added new assets classes to include infrastructure, commodities, and timber, among
others.
5

expenditures would be for schools, police, etc. The implications are that, from a risk
management perspective, states would prefer to have predictable pension contributions.12
Accordingly, asset allocation decisions would be a function of funding status: safe, wellfunded plans could invest in more risky securities, while underfunded plans would invest
in less risky assets. We use pension funding ratio to test the risk management hypothesis;
we expect lower pension plan asset betas and lower equity allocations to be associated
with lower levels of funding. We predict a positive coefficient for the pension funding
ratio variable.
3.2.

Risk transfer
Although the moral hazard (or risk transfer) issue is apparent for private DB

pension plans, as they are insured by the PBGC, public plans may also be affected.13
Taxpayers are ultimately responsible for underfunded public pension plans. Early
research on funding levels, such as Epple and Schipper (1981) or Inman (1981, 1982)
suggests that underfunding is a method of passing current pension costs to future
taxpayers. Presumably, the government can always raise taxes to fund pension plans.
D’Arcy, Dulebohn, and Oh (1999) consider a theoretical model for state pensions and
suggest that underfunding is not optimal, though, unless the growth in pension costs is
less than the growth in the tax base. However, politicians are “are not concerned about
long-term funding issues because they operate under a relatively short time horizon”
(Giertz and Papke 2007, p. 314). If the risk transfer hypothesis holds, the predicted sign
for the funding ratio is negative, as the severely underfunded pension funds would take
on more risk. In addition to the pension funding ratio we also use the previous years’
investment return (i.e., 1-, 3-, and 5-year) to test the risk transfer incentive. Funds that
experienced low returns in prior years may react by increasing risk in the current year;
thus, the predicted sign for the investment return coefficient is negative.

12

Indeed, one rationale for smoothing investment gains/losses is to provide more predictability of
contributions. Consequently, during severe market downturns, such as that experienced in 2008, the
reported underfunding is underreported.
13
Theoretically, private DB pension plan sponsors have an incentive to invest in a maximum level of risky
assets so that the put value of the PBGC insurance can be maximized (Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977). The
recent empirical evidence from Rauh (2009), however, does not support moral hazard issue.
6

3.3.

Political influence
Politics may play a role in pension fund investment policy. A typical board of

trustees includes representatives of active and retired members, plus political
appointees. 14 Coronado, Engen, and Knight (2003) examine whether a government entity
can invest money on behalf of employees in the same manner as a private pension fund.
They suggest that conflicts of interest result in public fund returns lying below the
risk/return frontier. After controlling for differences in asset allocation, they find
evidence that plan asset returns are diminished by certain types of political interference.
Illustrations of political influence include pressure to buy bonds issued by the state or
local government or to direct funds to economically targeted investments (ETI). The
prominent CalPERS fund directs a portion of its portfolio to The California Initiative for
private equity investment in businesses in underserved areas. 15 As of 2007, 10.8 percent
of the total CalPERS fund was invested in California. 16 Nofsinger (1998) suggests that
those funds investing in ETI experience lower returns compared to a benchmarked
portfolio and that underfunded plans that use high actuarially assumed returns are more
likely to invest in ETI. In contrast, Munnell and Sundèn (2001) argue that the amount of
ETI is small, less than 2.5 percent of assets, and does not adversely affect return. These
are early studies and include small sample sizes. Over the past decade more states (21)
have passed legislation allowing state pension funds to make targeted investments. In
2008, the Florida legislature passed a bill that allowed state pension funds to invest up to
1.5 percent of assets ($1.9 billion) in technology and high-growth investments that would
create high-wage jobs for Florida. 17 We consider political influence to invest locally or to
give consideration to social goals and include dummy variables if the state system
14

Typically a board oversees the fund investment. The STRS Ohio board includes seven teachers (five
active teachers and two retired teachers) and four investment experts appointed by the governor, the
speaker of the house, the senate president, and the superintendent of public instruction. The New Jersey
pension system has three teachers, two governor appointments, one elected by the board, and one treasurer
appointment.
15
This is from Hoffer (2004), p. 8.
16
From CalPERS (2007), p. 4.
17
OPPAGA (2008). A review of the Florida Growth Fund performance appears in OPPAGA Report No.
10-60, The Florida Growth Fund Added Investments in 2010, but It Is Still Too Early to Assess Total
Economic Impact. According to the data in the report, $73 million was invested in 11 companies.
Although some jobs were created, “the SBA does not expect to earn competitive rates of return on these
investments for at least 8 to 10 years because such investments typically involve relatively young or startup companies” (p. 3).
7

supports economically targeted investments. The predictive sign for the dummy
coefficient is positive. If, because of political influence, the plan administrators make
investments below the risk/return frontier, the remaining assets may be invested in riskier
securities, resulting in a higher plan beta or a larger percentage of equity allocation.
3.4.

Fiscal constraints
When states are constrained from issuing additional debt, underfunding pension

funds may substitute for borrowing (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009).

There is some

evidence that fiscal constraints do affect public pension plans. According to Eaton and
Nofsinger (2004), fiscal constraints cause states to manipulate actuarial assumptions to
lower required contribution. And, because states can justify a higher discount rate for
liabilities through the assumed rate of return, states facing financial constraints may
subsequently invest in riskier assets, resulting in higher pension plan betas or larger
equity allocations, or both. Proxy variables for state fiscal constraints include Moody’s
state ratings for general obligation bonds and state net tax-supported debt as a percentage
of personal income. 18 According to the fiscal constraints hypothesis, states that have
severe fiscal constraints (e.g., lower debt ratings and higher debt/personal income ratios)
would be more likely to substitute pension underfunding for debt and to take more risk in
their pension asset investment. We predict that the signs for the coefficients for state
ratings (lower rating coded with higher numeric value) and debt-to-personal income ratio
will be positive. We also use the percentage of actual employer contribution to annual
required contributions as a third measure of state fiscal constraints, assuming that states
with fiscal pressure are less likely to fully fund the yearly expense. We expect a negative
coefficient for employer contribution percentage if financial constraints hypothesis holds.
3.5.

Accounting effect
Public pension plans are regulated by GASB 25, which requires that the

underfunding gap be amortized and results in an increase to the required annual
contributions. The impact of amortizing the underfunding gap could be reduced by
increasing the return assumption. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, administrators are
allowed to discount liabilities at the assumed return. However, the pension plan may not
18

Both measures are obtained from Moody’s. As one of the two key measures used by analysts to compare
state debt burdens, net tax-supported debt refers to any debt “to which state resources are pledged for
payment.” See Moody’s Investors Service (2010). Another measure is debt per capita.
8

subsequently achieve the higher return. Indeed, Eaton and Nofsinger (2001) find that the
return assumption is not correlated with the actual fund performance, whereas the
percentage of the fund invested in equity is highly predictive of returns. Unless the fund
increases its actual return, underfunding will continue to grow.
Does the pension fund manager subsequently increase the allocation of funds to
equity to justify the high return assumption? Weller and Wenger (2009) do not find
evidence that public fund managers chase returns when they are underfunded. It does
appear, though, that funds are increasingly investing outside of the traditional debt/equity
mix, possibly to increase realized returns. Robertson and Wielezynski (2008) consider the
increase in asset allocation to alternative investments such as hedge funds, real estate, and
private equity funds and report no significant differences in the Sharpe ratio between
pension plans that invested in alternative assets and those that did not.
These findings support Rauh’s (2010) conclusion that public DB pension funds
are pursuing riskier investments. Park (2009) reports that public plan sponsors who use
high discount rates are 3.6 percent more likely to invest in higher risk assets than those
who use low discount rates. High discount groups may use more alternative investments,
but the same equity allocation. The accounting effect predicts a positive coefficient for
the return assumption.
3.6.

Union effect
Public employees represent a large voting bloc, and during the 1970s several

states gave public employees the right to collective bargaining. 19 Freeman (1983) reports
that employees associated with unions receive better benefits, such as changes in the
retirement factor and eligibility, early retirement without penalty, and increased COLAs.
Increased benefits naturally result in higher pension obligations. 20 Mitchell and Smith
19

For example, The Dill Act in 1978 gave California public employees the right to collective bargaining.
Current studies show that when compensation is viewed as a package, public employees are paid, on
average, 3.7 percent less than private employees. However, Keefe (2010) acknowledges that retirement
benefits account for a higher percentage of employee compensation: 8.1 percent for state and local
employees versus 4.8 percent for larger private employers (more than 500 employees). When comparing
defined benefit plans for private versus public employees, these are the salient differences: the factor
applied to the final average salary, an average of 2 percent versus 1.5 percent; early retirement
opportunities; and inflation-indexing of benefits (Munnell and Soto 2007). A direct comparison between
public and private retirement benefits is difficult, though, in that the defined benefit plan role for private
companies is shrinking. (Companies are focusing on 401(k) plans because in these plans market risks are
borne by the retiree, not the employer.)
20

9

(1994) find that greater unionization is associated with lower levels of pension funding.
That is, the demand for more wages and benefits occurs at the expense of less funding.
Concurrently, to cover the increased benefit expense, the investment policy, in terms of
equity and other asset allocation, could shift. For example, Proposition 21, passed by the
California legislature in 1984, removed the percentage limitations on equity and
alternative investments and simply required that the investments be “prudent,” i.e.,
exhibiting “the degree of care expected of a prudent person, who is knowledgeable in
investments.” 21 Our data include the percentage of public employees who are union
members and the percentage of public employees who are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. A positive coefficient for the percentage of union employees (and
for the percentage covered by collective bargaining) supports the union effect.
3.7.

Demographic effects
Age and gender of DB plan participants may affect the risk-taking behavior of the

fund. Traditional portfolio theory expects risk-taking tolerance to decline with age. We
use (1) the ratio of active members to annuitants and (2) the average age of active
employees as proxies for risk tolerance. We expect higher active-to-retired ratios and a
lower average age to be associated with higher levels of pension plan beta (equity
allocations). Eaton and Nofsinger (2008) cite more female active participants in the plan
as a primary factor associated with significantly lower funding ratios. Our data does not
provide gender variables. But the type of plan (teachers, police, firemen, etc) is provided,
and, traditionally, public school teachers are predominantly female. The effect of gender
on fund risk-taking behavior is ambiguous. Some studies have documented that females
are less likely to assume portfolio risk (e.g., Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List 2002).
Conversely, the observation that plans with more female active participants have higher
equity allocations or betas suggests that they may be more aggressive risk-takers. We use
a dummy variable to indicate whether a pension plan is for teachers, police/firefighter, or
the general public.

21

California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger campaigned to change the pension system so that new
employees would be covered by a 401(k)-style plan. However, the California state employees association
effectively mobilized and successfully campaigned against the proposal. This example is from Byrnes
(2005).
10

3.8.

Herding
Herding is common among institutional investors. According to Park (2009),

managers of public pension funds tend to follow peer group norms so that asset
allocation-to-equity hovers at around 64–75 percent. Pension fund managers, like other
fund managers, have career concerns and tend not to deviate from peer group investments
by holding nonconventional portfolios. Alternatively, public pension plan managers may
mimic the top performers or pension funds considered to be large and influential, such as
CalPERS.
Similar to Weller and Wenger (2009), we construct several variables to test
herding behavior in pension investment, including the top performer (winner) and
CalPERS’s equity percentage and pension asset beta.

A positive and significant

coefficient for the measures supports the herding effect.
3.9.

Other effects
Larger DB plans enjoy economies of scale for transaction fees. Accordingly, these

plans may invest more in equity and alternative investments and have higher pension plan
betas. We include the log of the plan size to test this effect. As mentioned by Eaton and
Nofsinger (2004), other funding assumptions may be manipulated. We look at the
amortization period for unfunded accumulated liability and project that funds that try to
minimize the effect of losses by having a longer amortization period will take more
investment risks.
4.

Data and variable construction
The data required for this study include public pension plan asset allocation,

funding ratios, plan asset returns, state government contributions and measures of fiscal
constraints, public employee unionization, and plan demographics. The major data source
is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at
Boston College. 22 The data are available from fiscal years 2001 through 2009, covering
126 pension systems for 50 states and the District of Columbia. These pension systems
together held $2.09 trillion pension assets at the end of fiscal year 2009. Each state
22

The PPD data are “collected from plans, annual reports, actuarial valuations, member handbooks, and
contact with plan administrators” (Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 2011).
11

administers at least one pension system, and each system has at least one pension plan.23
State government typically establishes multiple pension plans within one pension system
for different employee groups, such as teachers, police and firefighters, and state and
local government employees. The full sample has 1,134 pension system-year
observations from 2001 through 2009.
In regard to the state finance measures, we obtain the historical data on the state
general obligation bond ratings and net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal
income from Moody’s. The public employee union membership and coverage data are
obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. 24 In addition, some public
pension funds have special investment policies or initiatives related with economically
targeted investment (ETI), such as urban economic development policies. This
information is obtained from the Pension Funds and Urban Revitalization Center,
University of Oxford. 25
We describe the construction of pension risk, funding ratios, and the investment
herding measures in detail below and provide the definitions of other variables in
Appendix B.
4.1.

Pension risk
The first measure of pension risk is the percentage of total plan assets invested in

the equity market. The information is available in the Public Plans Database and reported
at pension system level. An alternative measure is pension asset beta, which is first used
by Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) as a measure of private pension plan asset risk. It is

23

The number of pension systems in each state ranges from one to six—California and Texas each have six
pension systems. 84 pension systems (out of a total of 126) have one pension plan, with the rest having
more than one pension plan. The number of pension plans for each state thus also varies, ranging from one
to seven—Washington and Texas each have seven pension plans.
24
The data are available at http://www.unionstats.com and are constructed by Barry Hirsch and David
Macpherson based on the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly household survey (Hirsch and
Macpherson 2003).
25
The data on the ETI are only available for the fiscal years 2001 and 2003. In addition, we obtain the
fiscal year 2008 ETI information from a research report conducted by the Office of Program Policy
Analysis and Government Accountability of the State of Florida (OPPAGA 2008). This report lists 21
states that made economically targeted investments using pension funds at the end of fiscal year 2008. We
assume these states had an ETI allocation in the fiscal year 2009.
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estimated as the weighted average beta of all asset classes in a pension plan’s total
assets. 26 That is,

PENSION_ASSET_BETA=

n

∑W × β
i =1

where Wi is the weight of each asset class and

i

n

∑W
i =1

i

i

,

(1)

= 1 , and βi is the estimated beta of

each asset. 27
Public pension plans generally classify their pension assets into five categories—
1) equities, 2) fixed income, 3) real estate, 4) alternatives, and 5) cash and other assets.
The weight of each asset class in the pension plan is obtained from the Public Plans
Database. The betas for equities, fixed income, real estate, and cash equivalents asset
classes are from Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006, Table 4, p. 9), as reported in Panel B of
Table 1. According to the authors, these beta estimates for asset classes are drawn from a
study by Harvard Management Company to determine the portfolio asset allocation. Note
that Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) do not have the estimated beta of alternatives. The
alternative investments of public pension plans generally refer to private equity
investments, venture capital, and commodities. 28 Previous studies have reported various
estimates of private equity beta. We assume a beta of 1.2 for the alternative asset class in
this study. 29
26

The Public Plans Database also reports actuarial pension assets. We do not use actuarial pension assets in
calculating pension asset beta because the data report each asset category as the percentage of a pension
system’s total market value, not as a percentage of pension actuarial assets.
27
Beta measures the sensitivity of financial asset returns to the overall stock market change (i.e., using the
S&P 500 Index as a proxy). Pension asset beta captures the risk of a pension plan’s exposure to alternative
investments, including private equity, venture capital, hedge funds, and other alternative assets, while the
use of the equity percentage could underestimate the true level of pension risk.
28
For example, the Alternative Investment Management Program (AIM) of CalPERS had a total of $48.4
billion in private equity investments as of March 31, 2010. According to a report by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO 2010), the most popular alternative investments currently held by the public
pension funds include private equity (venture capital and buyout), commodities, and hedge funds.
29
The estimated betas of private equity include 1.10 (Ljungqvist and Richardson 2002), 0.6 (Hwang,
Quigley, and Woodward 2005), 1.80 for venture capital and 0.66 for LBO (Kaplan and Schoar 2005), 1.7
(Cochrane 2003), 1.48 (Phalippou and Zollo 2005) and 1.01 (Nielsen 2009). For commodities beta, we
estimate the beta to be 0.77 using the S&P iShare GSCI Commodity Index from July 2006 to September
2010, based on the in-sample regression and using the S&P 500 as the benchmark. It is generally believed
that the alternative asset class has a beta greater than one. The beta of 1.2 is the simple average of the
estimated betas mentioned above, which we believe is a conservative estimate of an alternative asset beta.
Our results remain significant if we use other, higher beta values for the alternative asset class.
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4.2.

Funding ratios
Pension funding ratio is defined as the ratio of pension assets over pension

liabilities. As pension assets and liabilities can be measured by both actuarial value and
economic (market) value, we estimate actuarial and economic funding ratio, respectively.
In particular,
FUND_RATIO _ACTUARIAL=
FUND_RATIO_ ECONOMIC=

ACTUARIAL PENSION ASSETS
ACTUARIAL PENSION LIABILITIES

MARKET VALUE OF PENSION ASSETS
MARKET VALUE OF PENSION LIABILITIES

(2a)

;

(2b)

.

Both actuarial value and market value of pension plans are available in the Public
Plans Database. In measuring pension liabilities, the key difference between the actuarial
and the economic pension liabilities is the discount rate used to estimate the present value
of total pension liabilities. The expected rate of return of pension assets (in most cases, 8
percent) is used as the discount rate to estimate actuarial pension liabilities. This method
is currently used by actuaries and pension sponsors. As previously discussed, Novy-Marx
and Rauh (2010) contend that this method is not consistent with the risk level associated
with public pension liabilities.30 They advocate the use of either Treasury rate or
municipal bond yield as the appropriate discount factors in estimating public pension
liabilities. We obtain the economic pension liabilities for 50 states (excluding the District
of Columbia ) from Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009, 2010). The measures are available only
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. As a result, our measures of economic pension funding
ratios are available for 2008 and 2009.
Note that the pension asset allocation information and the market value of pension
assets are reported at pension system level, while actuarial assets and actuarial liabilities
are reported at pension plan level. In estimating actuarial pension funding ratio, we first
aggregate actuarial pension assets and liabilities across pension plans to arrive at the
actuarial pension assets and liabilities at system level, and then estimate pension funding
ratio based on Equation (2a). When estimating economic pension funding ratios, as the
economic pension liabilities estimated by Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010) are at the state
30

Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010, p. 1) contend that discounting liabilities in such a way “runs counter to the
entire logic of financial economics: financial stream of payment should be discounted at a rate that reflects
their risk (Modigliani and Miller 1958), and in particular their covariance with priced risks (Lintner 1965;
Sharpe 1964; Treynor 1961).”
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level, we first aggregate pension assets across systems to obtain the state-level pension
assets, then we estimate economic funding ratios based on Equation (2b).
4.3.

Herding variable
We use several measures to examine pension plan sponsors’ herding behavior in

making investments. In the spirit of Weller and Wenger (2009), to examine whether
pension plan sponsors follow the top performer, we identify the “winner” as the pension
plan with the highest annual investment returns year t. We look at the association
between the winner and the rest of pension funds’ equity allocation and pension asset
beta. Similarly, to examine whether plan sponsors follow other big and influential plans
with a high profile, such as CalPERS, we examine the relation between all other pension
funds’ equity allocation and pension asset beta with CalPERS.
4.4.

Other variables
Other variables include pension plan return assumption, employer contributions as

a percentage of annual required amount, measures of state government financial
constraints and unionization, and measures related to plan demographics and features.
We summarize the definitions of these variables in Appendix B.
5.

Empirical Results

5.1.

Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all plans during the entire period for

returns, funding ratios, demographic features, and other pension plan characteristics
(Panel A), state finance and unionization results (Panel B), asset allocations and plan
betas (Panel C), and restricted sample statistics for economic funding ratios (Panel D).
Based on prior research we expect to find plans, on average, to be underfunded and to
assume high investment returns with substantial equity allocations. Our sample statistics
confirm prior results, as discussed below.
The statistics in Panel A suggest that plans assume a high expected rate of return
but, on average, fail to reach those expectations. The mean investment return assumption
is 7.97 percent, with three-quarters of the observations higher than 7.80 percent.
Furthermore, the standard deviation, at 0.44 percent, indicates that plans do not often
change their assumed rate of return. In contrast to the assumed rate, the results for the
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investment returns are much lower. We provide the average one-, three- and five-year
return results and determine that pension plans underperform their expectations in each
case. At best, using the five-year average investment return, the plans underperform the
assumed rate of return by 2.54 percent. Figure 1 provides a comparison of the investment
return assumption versus the actual five-year investment return from 2001 to 2009. Over
the nine-year period, the funds suffered several disastrous returns compared to the 8
percent benchmark. Preliminary analysis, therefore, supports prior findings that public
pension funds are assuming unrealistic investment returns, which is contributing to the
underfunding status in that contributions are based on the assumed return. And our
descriptive data shows that funds were, on average, underfunded during 2001–2009.
The mean actuarial funding ratio for 2001–2009 is 86.01 percent, with half of the
observations lying within the range of 76.1 to 98.2 percent. The minimum (19.1 percent)
and the maximum (147.7 percent) suggest high variability of pension funding status.
Figure 2 illustrates that a major factor of underfunding status is the drop in pension
assets’ market value. As the stock market fell sharply in late 2008 and early 2009,
pension funds with large allocations of stocks would be more adversely affected. Note
that the average economic funding ratios shown in Panel D of Table 1, which are
estimated based on the data for the period 2008–2009, are much smaller than actuarial
funding ratios. The lower funding ratios are a function of higher pension liabilities, a
result caused by a more realistic discount factor reflecting the near certainty of retiree
payments. If the Treasury rate is used to discount liabilities, the funding ratio drops by
half.
As noted above, plans allocating a high percentage to equity are most affected by
market corrections. And most funds do invest a majority of their assets in stocks. As
shown in Panel C of Table 1, three-fourths of the sample observations have equity
allocations of 51 percent or more. On average, more than 56 percent of a plan’s assets are
allocated to equity, but the range (0 to 82 percent) and standard deviation (10.41 percent)
are large. The average asset beta of 0.6564 (and range from 0.1638 to 0.9096) is
consistent with the average asset allocations in that the maximum equity allocation is
slightly more than 80 percent. In Figure 3, we provide a comparison of asset allocation
and portfolio beta by year. Equity allocation peaked in 2004–2006 at 60 percent and then
16

declined to 50 percent during 2008 and 2009. Accordingly, portfolio beta follows a
similar trend, but decreases less than the equity allocation. We observe that the fixed
income allocation is lower in the later part of the sample period, thus the reduced
allocation to equity is matched more by increases in alternative investments than by debt.
Although the average alternative allocation over the entire period is 2.85 percent, from
Figure 3 we see that the 2009 allocation is closer to 5.51 percent (increased from 1.64
percent in 2001). In summary, compared to the mean values for the total period, equity
allocation is trending lower and fixed income allocation is relatively stable, but real estate
and alternative investment allocation are higher. As expected, pension asset betas, as of
2009, are close to the sample period average despite decreases in equity allocation due to
the increased investment in alternatives.
Factors that affect the underfunding problem include an aging workforce and state
budget problems. First, underfunding requires the plan sponsor to increase contributions
in order to diminish the gap. If a state faces financial constraints, then the increased
contributions necessary to amortize the underfunding amount attenuates the financial
crisis. Panel B of Table 1 shows that some states do face fiscal pressures, as measured by
state net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income or state credit ratings.
The reported range for the sample is 0.0 to 12.1 percent, with one-fourth of our
observations higher than 4.3 percent. For comparison purposes, consider that the median
debt percentage, as reported by Moody’s, was 2.1 percent in 2001 and 2.5 percent in
2009. 31 Additional signs of fiscal pressure may include the amortization period. And,
although the median amortization period for underfunding is 29 years, the maximum
observation is 40 years, and 25 percent of the observations exceed 30 years. Furthermore,
underfunded plans are more alarming if the workforce is aging. Plan descriptive data
from Panel A indicate an aging workforce because there are relatively few working
employees (2.69) for each retiree. Additional supporting evidence of workforce age is the
average age for active employees, nearly 45, with a standard deviation of just over 3
years.

31

From Moody’s Investors Service (2010).
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5.2.

Regression analysis

5.2.1. Univariate results
Results from univariate regressions for both equity allocation (column 1) and
pension asset beta (column 2) appear in Table 2. In general, the results are similar for
both dependent variables and provide consistent support for the accounting effect, risk
transfer, herding, fiscal constraint, and demographic and union effect hypotheses. In
contrast, the results do not support the risk management or political influence hypotheses.
We discuss the implications from these results below.
Positive and significant coefficients for the return assumption support the
accounting effect, which implies that a higher pension return assumption is associated
with a larger equity allocation and pension asset beta.

Negative and significant

coefficients for five of the six proxy variables (the economic funding ratio variables and
the lagged three- and five-year return variables) support the risk transfer hypothesis. That
is, managers take on more risk if the plan is underfunded and experienced poor
investment returns in the previous three or five years. 32 The coefficients for state
contribution as a percentage of annual required contributions, state debt ratings, and debt
burden are all consistent with the financial constraints hypothesis. In particular, pension
funds contributing less relative to annual required contributions have higher equity
allocations and pension asset betas. Similarly, pension funds sponsored by the states that
have lower credit ratings and higher tax-supported debt have higher allocations of equity
and higher betas. (We note that the coefficient for debt burden, although positive when
beta is the dependent variable, is not significantly different from zero.) In addition, there
appears to be a union effect, in that higher union membership percentages and a higher
percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining are associated with more risk.
Finally, strong results appear for the herding hypothesis using the CalPERS proxy: funds
tend to follow CalPERS for equity allocation, and funds tend to mimic changes in
CalPERS beta. On the other hand, the “winner” effect is significant for beta, but not for
equity allocation.

32

The one-year lagged return provides a conflicting result. We will discuss this finding in the multivariate
regression analysis.
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Pension fund type falls into three categories, including teacher (32 percent),
police/firefighter (8 percent), and general (60 percent).

As reported by Eaton and

Nofsinger (2008), funds that have a higher percentage of females are more likely to be
underfunded. Consequently, the underfunding may result in these plans adopting riskier
investment policies. Traditionally, teacher funds have the highest proportion of women,
and for our sample the dummy variable coefficient for teachers is positive and significant
at the 1 percent level for equity and the 5 percent level for beta, indicating that, by our
measure, this type of fund does have more risk. Conversely, the general fund dummy
variable is negative and significant at the 5 percent level for equity and the 10 percent
level for beta. We observe the insignificant coefficients for ETI in column 1, where the
dependent variable is equity percentage, indicating a lack of support for the political
influence hypothesis. On the other hand, we find that the coefficient for ETI is negative
and significant when pension asset beta is used as a dependent variable (column 2). This
result suggests that pension funds directing investment to ETI have significantly lower
risk, as measured by portfolio beta, which we believe to be the appropriate risk measure
for this variable.
Univariate analysis provides a preliminary indication of a variable’s effect on risk,
as measured by equity allocation or pension asset beta. In the next section we offer
multivariate models that include proxy variables for each hypothesis, since risk may be
affected by multiple factors.
5.2.2. Multivariate regression analysis
In this section we discuss the results from a series of multivariate regression
models that combine proxy variables for each hypothesis. We specify four models for the
full sample that use a different combination of variables for those hypotheses supported
in the univariate analysis. We specify multiple models employing different independent
variables, because of the colinearity of proxy variables for each hypothesis. This allows
us to check for robustness of the results. In addition, for each model, we report regression
results for equity allocation and asset beta as the dependent variables. Full sample results
are provided in Table 3.
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In general, we interpret the results from the full sample regressions to be
consistent with an accounting effect, to support risk transfer, and to suggest a tendency
for funds to mimic (herd) the winner or influential (CalPERS) fund. Furthermore, there is
some evidence indicating that a state’s fiscal environment affects the pension plan risk. In
most cases, the sign and significance level for the coefficients are consistent when the
regressions use either equity allocation percentage or pension asset beta as the dependent
variable. The following analysis provides a more detailed review of the results.
We observe consistent support for the accounting effect in that the coefficients for
the return assumption are positive and significant for all model specifications. In
particular, the coefficients for the return assumption for the equity allocation models
range from to 1.722 to 4.5101, implying that a 100-basis-point increase in pension return
assumption is associated with about a 1.72 to 4.51 percent increase in equity allocation.
The corresponding increase in pension asset beta given the same increase in the return
assumption is 0.0353 to 0.0627. If a fund assumes a higher rate of return, then the
allocation to equity increases and, correspondingly, the pension asset beta also increases.
The multiple regression results are consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis.
The coefficients for the lagged funding ratio and lag five-year returns are negative and
significant in Models 1 and 4, suggesting that pension funds tend to take high investment
risks when funding ratios are low and the previous-five-year investment returns are poor.
When investment risk is measured as pension asset beta in Model 3, the coefficient is
negative and significant for the lagged three-year return, supporting the risk transfer
hypothesis. An inconsistent result is the positive and significant coefficient for the oneyear lagged investment return for both equity and pension beta (Model 2), suggesting that
the overall pension asset risk would be higher (lower) following a high (low) investment
return in the prior year. This could be due to the change of portfolio weights—after a
good (bad) year, pension funds could tilt towards more (less) equity, thus the change of
portfolio allocation is merely an artifact of the market value of stocks in a good (or bad)
year.
If fiscal constraints affect risk-taking behavior, we would expect states with high
debt burdens and lower debt ratings to make riskier portfolio decisions. The regression
results are consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficients for state credit ratings (Model
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1) are significant at the 1 percent levels. As we define increasing credit risk with higher
scores, this result indicates that states with higher credit risk have riskier pension funds.
In Model 2, the coefficient for the DEBT_INCOME variable is positive and significant at
the 5 percent level for the equity allocation model, suggesting that higher state debt
burdens result in higher equity allocations. Finally, in Models 3 and 4, the negative and
significant coefficients for EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION, which is employer
contributions as a percentage of annual required contributions, indicates that employers
paying a lower percentage of the required contribution have higher allocations to equity.
These regression results suggest that states are substituting increased pension
underfunding for borrowing when they face fiscal constraints, consistent with the fiscal
constraint hypothesis.
The independent variables CALPERS_EQUITIES and WINNER_EQUITIES
measure the previous year’s equity allocation and are used to test the herding effect.
Across all models, the positive and significant coefficient for CALPERS_EQUTIES
indicates that pension funds indeed follow the investment strategy of high-profile plans
such as CalPERS. There is also some evidence that pension funds chase winners in their
investment, as shown in Model 2 when using pension asset beta as the dependent
variable. Similar results appear when using the beta change of CalPERS and winner as
measures for herding. The positive and significant coefficients suggest that funds mimic
changes in beta reported by influential pension funds.
Other variables, although significant in the univariate analysis, have mixed results
in the multivariate analysis. Results on the union effect are mixed, in that the only
significant coefficient appears in Model 1 for the beta specification, indicating higher
union membership results in higher asset betas. However, there appears to be no effect
when using equity allocation as a measure of investment risk, as evidenced by the
insignificant coefficients for the percentage of public employees who are union members
and the percentage of employees who are covered by a collective barging agreement.
Higher ratios for active employees are associated with more risk for both equity (Models
1 and 2) and beta specifications (Model 1), 33 while a higher average age negatively
33

Note that the coefficient for active to annuitant ratio in the univariate regression is negative. A further
examination of the data shows that the inconsistent result could be due to data outliers. In particular, the
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affects beta (Model 1) but not equity allocation. The fund size is consistently significant
and positive for beta specifications and for equity allocation in Models 3 and 4. This may
be due to the observation that larger funds allocate more to alternative investments, which
would affect beta more than equity allocation. Larger funds could also be more likely to
invest in alternative investments instead of fixed income. The plan type effect disappears
in the multiple regression models. Eaton and Nofsinger (2008) find that teacher plans are
more underfunded. A primary factor associated with such underfunding is the fact that
more females are active participants in these plans. Therefore, the relatively high risk
exposure of teacher pension plans could be related to their underfunding levels and is not
necessarily an indication of high risk preference.
Results and conclusions are similar when the sample is restricted to economic
funding ratio and ETI data in Table 4. For Models 1 to 3, the sample period is fiscal years
2001, 2003, 2008, and 2009, while the sample period is 2008 and 2009 for Models 4 and
5 because of the data availability of ETI and economic funding ratios, respectively.
Again, we run two sets of regressions, using either equity allocation or pension asset beta
as the dependent variable. We observe support for the accounting effect in Models 1–3:
higher return assumption is associated with higher allocations to equity and higher betas.
The negative and significant coefficients for economic funding ratios (using either
Treasury rate or municipal bond yield as a discount rate for pension liabilities) in Models
4 and 5 are consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis, indicating that funds increase
equity allocation or pension asset beta when they have lower funding ratios.

The

coefficients of previous three- or five-year investment returns are negative and
significant, which suggests that pension funds assume more risks following low
investment returns, providing further evidence supporting the risk transfer hypothesis.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that funds with more active members are riskier.
Somewhat surprisingly, there is some evidence suggesting that ETI investing is
associated with lower risk, in that the coefficients for ETI in Models 1–3 are significant
and negative. We also note that LOGSIZE in Model 5 (where the dependent variable is
active to annuitant ratios for the pension system of Washington School Employees and Teachers were
31.59 from 2001 to 2004, much larger than the sample average ratio of 2.69 (see Panel A of Table 1). If we
truncate the top ten percentile data and run the univariate regression again, we obtain the coefficient for
active to annuitant ratio of 0.0179 (t = 2.44). Meantime, the multivariate regression result using this revised
sample does not change significantly.
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equity allocation) has a negative coefficient (significant at the 10 percent level),
suggesting that the larger size of pension assets is associated with lower equity allocation.
Again, this could be related to larger funds investing in higher levels of alternative
assets. 34
5.2.3. Endogeneity issue
If equity allocation, the actuarial funding ratio, and the state rating are jointly
determined, then OLS regression provides biased estimators. In effect, there is a possible
feedback effect between equities allocation and underfunding; that is, the causal effect
could extend in both directions. Furthermore, the same logic applies to the state rating
and severe pension underfunding. As public pension plans are a contractual liability,
lower pension funding could result in lower credit ratings. To account for the endogeneity
issue, we construct a simultaneous set of regression equations for equity allocation, state
ratings, and funding ratios. We then use a two-stage procedure to estimate the model
coefficients; those results appear in Table 5. In column 1, when the dependent variable is
equity allocation, we continue to see that our results are consistent with those previously
reported. In particular, there is a positive and significant coefficient for the return
assumption, consistent with the accounting effect. A significant and negative coefficient
for the funding ratio is consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Consistent with a
herding effect, there is a positive and significant coefficient for CalPERS equity
allocation. Finally, the coefficient for a state’s credit rating is positive and significant,
consistent with the fiscal constraints hypothesis.
It is worth noting some other interesting findings when dependent variables are
state credit ratings and actuarial pension funding ratios. As shown in column 2, lower
funding ratios, heavy debt burden, and higher union membership are associated with
lower credit ratings. The results in column 3 suggest that larger equity allocation is
actually related to lower pension funding ratios. In addition, larger union membership,
higher active to annuitants ratio, and younger workforce age are associated with better
actuarial pension funding ratios.

34

This could also be due to the significantly reduced sample size, which has 53 observations for fiscal
years 2008 and 2009.
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5.2.4. Asset allocation in credit crisis period
Our sample period extends through one of the largest market crises in 2008. We
expect that the risk-taking behavior of public pension funds may differ between pre- and
post-2008. In Table 6, we provide the preliminary findings on the public pension risktaking during credit crisis. In examining the mean and median for asset allocation
categories, pension asset beta, and return assumption, we find a significant drop in
equities and significant increases in real estate and alternative investments. Cash
allocation, on average, increased by more than 3 percent. The significant drop in pension
asset beta follows the allocation change, in that the beta for real estate and cash
equivalents is less than that for equity. Overall, we observe that pension funds are taking
less risk after the recent financial crisis.
6.

Conclusion
During the period 2001–2009, the average actuarial funding ratio for public

defined benefit plans was 86 percent, with a trend of decreased funding. Prior research
suggests that public pension plans are underfunded because of public accounting rules
that allow managers to assume high discount rates for relatively certain retiree payouts.
Initially, this high discount rate reduces required contributions.

But, in reality, the

liabilities are understated, and the plan may become severely underfunded on an
economic basis. Consequently, plan managers could attempt to increase return and would
hope to reduce the underfunding by investing in riskier assets. But riskier assets are more
volatile, and given the market downturns in 2008 and 2009, the funding ratio is slightly
below 80 percent (as of 2009) and the aggregate market value of pension assets has fallen
to near-2001 figures.
An investment policy of increasing risk exposure on the asset side, while
liabilities continue to increase with near certainty, can be a poor gamble. Why would
managers play this game? One motivation might be political decisions to make certain
investments. Another could be transferring funding shortfalls as tax burdens to future
generations. In addition, bargaining by unions could result in higher benefits, accounting
incentives tend to guide behavior, and states may feel pressure because of fiscal
constraints. Yet another motivation may be a desire on the part of managers to mimic the
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actions of the best fund or of other large funds.

Using proxy variables for these

hypothesized effects, we look at the risk measures, as defined by allocation to equity and
pension plan asset beta, for public plans from 2001 to 2009 and provide the first
comprehensive analysis of public pension funding risk-taking behavior.
Unlike reported results for private pension plans, results for public plans indicate
that public fund managers appear to assume more risk if the plans are already
underfunded. This evidence is consistent with risk-transfer or with an intention to pass
underfunded current pension obligations on to future taxpayers. There is a degree of
“follow the leader,” in that plan managers tend to follow the risk-investing behavior of
successful pension fund managers. We find evidence to support the hypothesis that state
and local fiscal constraints are associated with higher levels of pension fund risk.
Furthermore, the results offer just mild support of a public union effect—that is, in order
to provide for larger retirement benefits, the fund manager pursues a riskier investment
allocation. Ironically, it has been suggested that public employees accept lower pay,
compared to the private sector, in exchange for job security and better benefits. Yet,
higher promised retirement benefits are not consistently funded by state and local
governments, and fund managers may take additional risks to compensate for the
underfunding. The appropriate response by the employer may be to increase contributions
to the fund instead of increasing the risk of the fund’s investment.
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Appendix A: Summary of Hypotheses, Treatment Variables and Expected Signs
Hypothesis

Risk management

Risk transfer

Political influence
Fiscal constraint

Accounting effect
Union

Demographic

Herding

Other

Treatment variable
(notation)
1) Lagged funding ratio—actuarial
(LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL)
2) Lagged funding ratio—economic, using Treasury yield as a
discount rate (LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASURY)
3) Lagged funding ratio – economic, using muni bond yield as a
discount rate (LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS)
1) Lagged funding ratio—actuarial
(LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL)
2) Lagged funding ratio—economic, using Treasury yield as a
discount rate (LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASURY)
3) Lagged funding ratio—economic, using muni bond yield as a
discount rate (LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS)
4) Lagged 1-year pension fund investment returns
(LAG_INVRETURN1YR)
5) Lagged 3-year pension fund investment returns
(LAG_INVRETURN3YR)
6) Lagged 5-year pension fund investment returns
(LAG_INVRETURN5YR)
Economically targeted investment (ETI) dummy
1) ETI
1) Moody’s state ratings for general obligation bond (RATING)
2) State net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal
income (DEBT_INCOME)
3) Employer contribution as a percentage of annual required
amount (EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION)
1) Pension plan return assumption (RETURN_ASSUMPTION)
1) Public employee union membership percentage
(UNION_MEMBERSHIP_PCT)
2) Public employee covered by collective bargaining agreement
% (BARGAIN_PCT)
1) Active to annuitant ratio (ACTIVE_ANNUITANT)
2) Average age of active employee (ACTIVE_AGE)
3) Teachers (dummy)—more female (TEACHERS)
4) Police or fire (dummy) (POLICEFIRE)
5) General (dummy) (GENERAL)
1) CalPERS’s percentage of equity allocation
(CALPERS_EQUITY)
2) CalPERS’s pension asset beta (CALPERS_BETA)
3) Top performer’s (winner) percentage of equity allocation
(WINNER_EQUITY)
4) Top performer’s (winner) pension asset beta
(WINNER_BETA)
1) Log of pension system market value (LOGSIZE)
2) Amortization period (AMORTIZATION_PERIOD)

26

Expected sign for treatment
variable if dependent variable is
Pension asset
Equity
beta
percentage
+

+
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+
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
This table summarizes the variable definitions and data sources. The major data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained
from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011). In addition, we obtain the historical data on the state general
obligation bond ratings and the net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income from Moody’s, and the public employee
union membership and coverage from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. ETI data for years 2001 and 2003 are obtained
from the Pension Funds and Urban Revitalization Center, University of Oxford. Data for the years 2008 and 2009 are from the Office
of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability of the State of Florida.
Variable notation
EQUITIES
PENSION_ASSET_BETA

Definition
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in the equity market.
Pension asset beta is estimated as the weighted average beta of all asset
classes in a pension fund, as in Equation (1).

FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL

Pension plan actuarial funding ratio is estimated as the ratio of actuarial
pension assets over actuarial pension liabilities, as in Equation (2a). Actuarial
pension liabilities are estimated using the expected rate of return on plan
assets as a discount factor.
Previous year’s pension plan actuarial funding ratio

LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARI
AL
FUND_RATIO_ECONOMIC
FUND_RATIO_TREASURY
FUND_RATIO_MUNIS

LAG_
FUND_RATIO_TREASURY
LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS
RETURN_ASSUMPTION
INVRETURN1YR

Pension plan economic funding ratio, as in Equation (2b), is estimated as the
ratio of the market value of pension assets over the market value of pension
liabilities, where the market value of pension liabilities is estimated using
Treasury bond yield or state municipal bond yield as a discount factor. We
obtain pension economic liabilities for year 2008 and 2009 from Novy-Marx
and Rauh (2009, 2010).
Previous year’s pension-plan economic funding ratio using Treasury
rate/municipal bond yield as a discount rate for pension liabilities
The expected rate of return on pension plan assets
1-year investment returns of total pension assets

Data source
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database;
Jin, Merton, and Bodie
(2006, Table 4)
Public Plans Database

Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database;
Novy-Marx and Rauh
(2009, 2010) tables

Public Plans Database;
Novy-Marx and Rauh
(2009, 2010) tables
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database

INVRETURN3YR
INVRETURN5YR
LAG_INVRETURN1YR
LAG_INVRETURN3YR
LAG_INVRETURN5YR
ETI

3-year investment returns of total pension assets
5-year investment returns of total pension assets
Previous 1-year investment returns of total pension assets
Previous 3-year investment returns of total pension assets
Previous 5-year investment returns of total pension assets
A dummy variable that takes 1 if a pension plan has economically targeted
investment and/or urban revitalization investment policy; zero otherwise.

RATING

A state credit rating for its general obligation bond. We convert the letter
rating to numerical value as follows (larger number indicates higher credit
risk):
Aaa=1; Aa1=3; Aa2=5; Aa3=7; A1=9; A2=11; Baa1=13; with large number
indicating high credit risk or strong fiscal constraint.
A state net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income
Employer contribution as a percentage of annual required contribution
The percentage of state public employees that is unionized

DEBT_INCOME
EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION
UNION_MEMERSHIP_PCT
BARGAIN_PCT
CALPERS_EQUITIES
WINNER_EQUITIES
CALPERS_BETA
WINNER_BETA

The percentage of state public employees that is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement
CalPERS’s equity asset allocation
Pension funds top performer’s (winner) equity asset allocation, where the
winner is defined as the pension plan with the highest annual investment
return
CalPERS’s pension asset beta. Beta measures the sensitivity of financial asset
returns to the overall stock market change (i.e., using the S&P 500 Index as a
proxy.
Pension funds top performer’s (winner) pension asset beta, where the winner
is defined as the pension plan with the largest annual investment return. Beta
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Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Pension Funds and
Urban Revitalization
Web site, University of
Oxford; State of
Florida research report
Moody’s

Moody’s
Public Plans Database
Union Membership and
Coverage Database
Union Membership and
Coverage Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
and Jin, Merton, and
Bodie (2006, Table 4)
Public Plans Database
and Jin, Merton, and

ACTIVE_ANNUITANT
TEACHERS
POLICEFIRE
GENERAL
LOGSIZE
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD
FIXED_INCOME
REAL_ESTATE
ALTERNATIVES
CASH_OTHER_ASSETS
DOMESTIC_EQUITIES
INTL_EQUITIES
DOMESTIC_FIXEDINCOME
INTL_FIXEDINCOME

measures the sensitivity of financial asset returns to the overall stock market
change (i.e., using the S&P 500 Index as a proxy.
The ratio of active employees over annuitants of a pension plan
A dummy variable that takes 1 if a pension plan is a teachers’ plan, and 0
otherwise.
A dummy variable that takes 1 if a pension plan is a police/firefighters plan,
and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable that takes 1 if a pension plan is a general plan that covers
public employees (excluding teachers and police/firefighters), and 0
otherwise.
Log of the market value of a pension system
The years of a pension plan’s amortization period
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in fixed income
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in real estate
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in the alternatives
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in cash and other assets
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in the domestic equity market
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in the international equity
market
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in domestic fixed income
The percentage of pension fund assets invested in international fixed income
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Bodie (2006, Table 4)
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
Public Plans Database
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of pension plan characteristics
RETURN_ASSUMPTION
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL
INVRETURN1YR
INVRETURN3YR
INVRETURN5YR
LAG_INVRETURN1YR
LAG_INVRETURN3YR
LAG_INVRETURN5YR
EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION
TEACHERS
POLICEFIRE
GENERAL
SMOOTHING_PERIOD
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD
ETI
CALPERS_EQUITIES
WINNER_EQUITIES
CALPERS_BETA
WINNER_BETA
ACTIVE_AGE
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT
MKT_VALUE ($ bil.)
LOGSIZE

Mean

Std.

Min.

P25

Median

P75

Max.

N

0.0797
0.8601
0.8705
0.0347
0.0478
0.0543
0.0563
0.0539
0.0561
0.9251
0.3175
0.0794
0.6032
3.9927
25.7120
0.4514
0.5713
0.4291
0.7077
0.5297
44.7048
2.6891
17.8034
15.9353

0.0044
0.1629
0.1611
0.1166
0.0610
0.0406
0.0967
0.0597
0.0406
0.3198
0.4657
0.2704
0.4895
2.1900
7.9549
0.4983
0.0559
0.2431
0.0302
0.2045
3.2673
3.8282
27.4094
1.2618

0.0450
0.1910
0.1910
–0.3802
–0.0916
–0.0220
–0.2890
–0.0901
–0.0170
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.4375
0.0000
0.6409
0.1708
34.4100
0.0387
0.1799
12.1003

0.0780
0.7610
0.7759
–0.0490
0.0000
0.0250
–0.0240
0.0000
0.0260
0.8130
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
20.0000
0.0000
0.5656
0.4653
0.6963
0.5295
43.6000
1.6265
3.6374
15.1068

0.0800
0.8720
0.8811
0.0371
0.0450
0.0462
0.0702
0.0500
0.0500
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
5.0000
29.0000
0.0000
0.5970
0.4708
0.7165
0.5680
44.6000
2.0144
8.8014
15.9904

0.0825
0.9820
0.9940
0.1270
0.1019
0.0877
0.1336
0.1070
0.0890
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
5.0000
30.0000
1.0000
0.6078
0.5840
0.7283
0.6735
45.7000
2.5222
18.7825
16.7484

0.0900
1.4770
1.4770
0.2883
0.1790
0.1750
0.2883
0.1790
0.1750
2.6300
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
10.0000
40.0000
1.0000
0.6190
0.7187
0.7422
0.7781
60.0000
31.5900
251.1227
19.3415

1,112
1,111
990
859
857
858
758
756
757
1,134
1,134
1,134
1,134
1,096
989
350
1,134
1,134
1,134
1,134
867
1,119
1,132
1,132

0.1759
0.1719
2.5666
0.0226

0.0517
0.1038
1.0000
0.0000

0.0517
0.1038
1.0000
0.0000

0.2818
0.3298
5.0000
0.0240

0.5010
0.5424
7.0000
0.0430

0.7241
0.7484
13.0000
0.1210

459
459
407
450

Panel B: Summary statistics of state finance and unionization
UNION_MEMERSHIP_PCT
BARGAIN_PCT
RATING
DEBT_INCOME

0.3297
0.3746
4.6511
0.0301
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Panel C: Summary statistics of pension plan asset allocation and pension asset beta
EQUITIES
DOMESTIC_EQUITIES
INTL_EQUITIES
FIXED_INCOME
DOMESTIC_FIXEDINCOME
INTL_FIXEDINCOME
REAL_ESTATE
ALTERNATIVES
CASH_OTHER_ASSETS
PENSION_ASSET_BETA

Mean
0.5634
0.3673
0.1505
0.2884
0.1537
0.0113
0.0534
0.0285
0.0660
0.6564

Std.
0.1041
0.1468
0.0720
0.1014
0.1630
0.0258
0.0482
0.0506
0.0626
0.0975

Min.
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1638

P25
0.5100
0.3210
0.1180
0.2315
0.0000
0.0000
0.0002
0.0000
0.0130
0.6067

Median
0.5790
0.4010
0.1610
0.2700
0.1600
0.0000
0.0500
0.0000
0.0490
0.6708

P75
0.6300
0.4575
0.1990
0.3343
0.2680
0.0040
0.0852
0.0440
0.1050
0.7191

Max.
0.8200
0.7500
0.3262
1.0000
1.0000
0.1900
0.2840
0.4200
0.3040
0.9096

N
1,134
1,119
1,119
1,134
1,092
1,091
1,134
1,134
1,134
1,134

Assumed Beta
1.0000
--0.1750
--0.1500
1.2000
0.0060
--

Panel D: Summary statistics of restricted sample (2008/2009)
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL
FUND_RATIO_TREASURY
FUND_RATIO_MUNIS
LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASURY
LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS

Mean
0.7976
0.3796
0.5782
0.3566
0.5833

Std.
0.1504
0.0901
0.1249
0.0839
0.1313

Min.
0.3910
0.2115
0.3419
0.2115
0.3419

P25
0.7010
0.3030
0.4934
0.2924
0.4763

Median
0.7920
0.3857
0.5608
0.3517
0.5741

P75
0.9000
0.4402
0.6799
0.4082
0.6799

Max.
1.2800
0.5920
0.8333
0.5305
0.8333

N
245
155
155
58
58

This table reports descriptive statistics for the major variables used in the study. Panel A provides summary statistics for pension plan return assumption,
investment returns, employer contributions, and other plan characteristics, based on full sample from 2001 to 2009, except for the variable of ETI (a dummy
variable indicating whether a pension plan makes economically targeted investments), which has a sample period of 2001, 2003, 2008, and 2009. Panel B
provides summary statistics for measures of state financial constraints and state unionization data. Panel C provides summary statistics of pension plan asset
allocation and pension asset beta. Panel D provides pension funding ratios, based on a restricted sample of 2008 and 2009. The major data source is the Public
Plans Database (PPD), obtained from the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011). In addition, we obtain the historical data on the state general
obligation bond ratings and the net tax-supported debt as a percentage of personal income from Moody’s, and we obtain the public employee union membership
and coverage from the Union Membership and Coverage Database. ETI data for the years 2001 and 2003 are obtained from the Pension Funds and Urban
Revitalization Center, University of Oxford, and ETI data for the years 2008 and 2009 are from the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability (OPPAGA) of the State of Florida. The betas for equities, fixed income, real estate, and cash equivalents asset classes in Panel C are from Jin,
Merton, and Bodie (2006, Table 4, p. 9), and the beta for alternative assets is the author’s estimation. The full sample is from 2001 to 2009, with 1,134 pension
system-year observations for 50 states and the District of Columbia. The variable definitions are summarized in Appendix B.
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Table 2: Univariate Regression Analysis of Public Pension Risk-Taking Behavior, Using Equities or
Pension Asset Beta as a Dependent Variable
RETURN_ASSUMPTION
(N = 1,112)
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL
(N = 990)
LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASURY
( N = 55, 58)
LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS
(N = 58)
LAG_INVRETURN1YR
(N = 758)
LAG_INVRETURN3YR
(N = 756)
LAG_INVRETURN5YR
(N = 756)
EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION
(N = 1,134)
ETI
(N = 350)
RATING
(N = 1,107)
DEBT_INCOME
(N = 1,107)
UNION_MEMBERSHIP_PCT
(N = 1,125)
BARGAIN_PCT
(N = 1,125)
CALPERS_EQUITIES
(N = 1,134)
WINNER_EQUITIES
(N = 1,134)
CALPERS_BETA
(N = 1,134)
WINNER_BETA
(N = 1,134)
ACTIVE_AGE
(N = 867)
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT
(N = 1,119)
TEACHERS
(N = 1,134)
POLICEFIRE
(N = 1,134)
GENERAL
(N = 1,134)
LOGSIZE
(N = 1,132)
SMOOTHING_PERIOD
(N = 1,096)
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD
(N = 989)

Column 1
EQUITIES
4.1811***
(4.55)
–0.0140
(-0.84)
–0.5123***
(–4.09)
–0.2963***
(–3.88)
0.0788**
(2.13)

Column 2
PENSION_ASSET_BETA
5.3763***
(5.91)
–0.0284*
(–1.76)
–0.4719***
(–3.20)
–0.3207***
(–3.51)
0.0966***
(3.07)

–0.2695***
(–4.58)
–0.8296***
(–9.63)
–0.0210**
(–2.33)
–0.0158
(–1.38)
0.0055***
(5.10)
0.1892**
(2.38)
0.0458**
(2.55)
0.0484***
(2.59)
0.5080***
(9.36)
–0.0016
(–0.13)

–0.1433**
(–2.53)
–0.5488***
(–6.35)
–0.0188**
(–2.07)
–0.0236
(–2.14)
0.0049***
(4.79)
0.1752
(1.38)
0.0531***
(3.19)
0.0515***
(3.00)

–0.0039***
(–3.56)
–0.0032***
(–7.97)
0.0213***
(3.60)
–0.0138
(–1.00)
–0.0153**
(–2.51)
0.0070***
(3.17)
–0.0028
(–1.53)
0.0011***
(2.92)

0.5677***
(5.92)
0.0335**
(2.39)
–0.0049***
(–4.65)
–0.0048***
(–10.46)
0.0146**
(2.52)
–0.0100
(–0.96)
–0.0101*
(–1.78)
0.0116***
(5.72)
–0.0037**
(–2.28
0.0017**
(2.92)

This table reports the results of univariate regression analyses of public pension risk-taking behavior. The
dependent variable is EQUITIES, or the percentage of pension fund assets invested in the equity market
and pension asset beta (PENSION_ASSET_BETA). t-values are reported in parentheses, with the standard
errors clustered at system-year level (Petersen 2009) and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The full sample is
from 2001 to 2009, with 1,134 pension system–year observations for 50 states and the District of
Columbia. An exception is for the variable of ETI (a dummy variable indicating whether a pension plan
makes economically targeted investments), which has a sample period of 2001, 2003, 2008, and 2009. N in
the parenthesis shows the number of observations used for the univariate regression. The variable
definitions and data sources are summarized in Appendix B. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Public Pension Risk-Taking Behavior
Model 1
EQUITIES

RETURN_ASSUMPTION
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL
LAG_INVRETURN1YR

1.7220*
(1.95)
–0.0481**
(–2.01)

PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

3.5279***
(4.17)
–0.0382**
(–2.48)

LAG_INVRETURN3YR

Model 2
EQUITIES

4.5101***
(2.98)
0.2009***
(6.78)

PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

5.9580***
(3.84)
0.1311***
(4.89)

LAG_INVRETURN5YR
RATING
DEBT_INCOME

0.0047***
(3.21)

0.0022***
(2.61)

EMPLOYER_CONTRIBUTION
UNION_MEMERSHIP_PCT
BARGAIN_PCT
CALPERS_EQUITIES
WINNER_EQUITIES

0.0340
(1.39)
0.5054**
(7.72)

CALPERS_BETA

0.4940***
(5.04)

WINNER_BETA
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT
ACTIVE_AGE
TEACHERS
POLICEFIRE

0.0543***
(2.83)

0.0208***
(4.80)
–0.0009
(–0.67)
0.0101
(1.27)

0.0164***
(5.68)
–0.0024***
(–4.39)
–0.0067
(–1.62)

GENERAL
LOGSIZE
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD
2

Adj. R
N

0.0036
(1.00)
0.0009*
(1.67)
0.1917
638

0.0090***
(5.17)
0.0016***
(3.99)
0.1839
638

0.3968**
(2.40)

0.1518
(0.95)

0.0197
(0.68)

0.0149
(0.58)

0.0110
(0.71)

0.0188**
(2.20)

0.0392**
(2.35)
0.0061
(0.80)

0.0083
(0.44)

–0.0037
(–0.27)

0.0029
(0.92)
0.0005
(1.23)
0.0979
788

0.0109***
(3.66)
0.0007*
(1.79)
0.1214
788

Model 3
EQUITIES

4.3189***
(2.90)

PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

6.1668***
(4.05)

–0.1019
(–1.54)

–0.1433**
(–2.01)

–0.0247**
(–1.99)
0.0244
(0.93)
0.5946***
(7.08)

Model 4
EQUITIES

4.4581***
(2.97)

6.2724***
(4.10)

–0.3207***
(–3.54)

–0.3000***
(–3.62)

–0.0138
(–1.13)

–0.0240*
(–1.95)

–0.0120
(–0.98)

0.0150
(0.66)

0.0190
(0.72)
0.5666***
(7.43)

0.0109
(0.48)

0.8276***
(4.89)

0.7421***
(5.75)

0.0115
(1.36)

0.0033
(0.45)

0.0096
(1.16)

0.0017
(0.23)

–0.0068
(–1.05)
0.0065**
(2.12)
0.0004
(0.97)
0.1121
786

0.0094
(1.55)
0.0125***
(4.37)
0.0008**
(2.26)
0.1273
786

–0.0076
(–1.17)
0.0073**
(2.40)
0.0003
(0.70)
0.1232
787

0.0088
(1.44)
0.0131***
(4.62)
0.0007**
(2.01)
0.1369
787

This table reports the results of multivariate regression analyses of public pension risk-taking behavior. The
dependent variables are equity allocation or pension asset beta. t- values are reported in parentheses, with
the standard errors clustered at system-year level (Petersen 2009) and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The
variable definitions and data sources are summarized in Appendix B. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

Table 4: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Public Pension Risk-Taking Behavior Based on a Restricted Sample
Model 1
RETURN_ASSUMPTION
LAG_FUND_RATIO_TREASYRT

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

EQUITIES

PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

EQUITIES

PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

EQUITIES

PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

6.3979**
(2.18)

6.2545**
(2.00)

6.4418**
(2.15)

6.2946*
(1.98)

6.999**
(2.22)

6.6449**
(2.01)

Model 5

EQUITIES

PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

0.0095
(0.01)
–0.3310**
(–2.19)

5.0495
(1.14)
–0.3855**
(–2.04)

LAG_FUND_RATIO_MUNIS
LAG_INVRETURN1YR
LAG_INVRETURN3YR

–0.0105
(–0.16)

0.0028
(0.05)

LAG_INVRETURN5YR
ETI
UNION_MEMERSHIP_PCT

–0.2454**
(–2.08)

–0.1520
(–1.32)

–0.0289*
(–1.91)

–0.0303**
(–2.13)

–0.0264*
(–1.71)

–0.0292**
(–2.03)

–0.5458***
(–3.31)
–0.0254*
(–1.70)

0.0709

0.0780

0.0914

0.0884

0.1238

200

200

200

200

200

–0.3553**
(–2.18)
–0.0279**
(–1.98)

4.6552
(1.17)

–
0.1823**
(–2.03)

–0.2854***
(–2.82)

0.0962

0.0741
(0.59)
0.0649*
(1.86)
0.0362
(0.96)
–0.0334*
(–1.74)
0.0023
(0.95)
0.1969

0.0270
(0.35)
0.0650**
(2.50)
–0.0025
(–0.09)
–0.0123
(–0.88)
0.0002
(0.09)
0.2781

200

53

53

53

53

LOGSIZE
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD

N

0.0451
(0.01)

0.0230
(0.37)
0.0598**
(2.23)
0.0021
(0.08)
–0.0106
(–0.70)
0.0001
(0.02)
0.2376

TEACHERS

2

PENSION_
ASSET_BETA

0.0830
(0.66)
0.0601*
(1.73)
0.0380
(1.02)
–0.0302
(–1.56)
0.0020
(0.87)
0.2035

ACTIVE_ANNUITANT

Adj. R

EQUITIES

This table reports the results of multivariate regression analyses of public pension risk-taking behavior based on a restricted sample. That is, the sample period
used for Models 1 to 3 is 2001, 2003, 2008 and 2009 because of the data availability of ETI. The sample period for Models 4 and 5 is 2008 and 2009 because of
the data availability used to estimate economic pension funding ratios. The dependent variables are EQUITIES and PENSION_ASSET_BETA. t- values are
reported in parentheses, with the standard errors clustered at system-year level (Petersen 2009) and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The variable definitions and
data sources are summarized in Appendix B. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Simultaneous Regression Equations of Equity Allocation, State Credit Ratings, and Funding
Ratios

RETURN_ASSUMPTION
LAG_FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Dependent variable:
EQUITIES
1.8868*
(1.75)
–0.0792**
(–2.12)

Dependent variable:
RATING
–21.1765
(–0.64)

Dependent variable:
FUND_RATIO_ACTUARIAL
10.9721
(1.12)

EQUITIES
LAG_INVRETURN3YR
RATING
DEBT_INCOME
UNION_MEMBERSHIP_PCT
CALPERS_EQUITIES
ACTIVE_ANNUITANT
ACTIVE_AGE
TEACHERS
LOGSIZE
AMORTIZATION_PERIOD
Adj R
N

2

0.0057*
(1.82)

–2.8033***
(–2.84)
–3.9679
(–0.92)
–1.5639
(–0.80)
36.5359***
(4.56)
3.7100***
(4.64)

0.0303
(0.74)
0.5089***
(6.84)
0.0406***
(4.65)
–0.0029
(–1.55)
0.0054
(0.54)
0.0021
(0.47)
–0.0006
(–0.10)
0.1617
498

–7.5268***
(–3.35)
–0.1462
(–0.30)
0.0017
(0.04)
0.5350
(0.25)
0.5572**
(1.99)
0.3568***
(3.08)
–0.0279*
(–1.75)

0.1313
498

0.0149
498

This table reports the simultaneous regression results where the dependent variables are equity allocation,
state credit ratings, and actuarial pension funding ratios. t- values are reported in parentheses and adjusted
for heteroskedasticity. The variable definitions and data sources are summarized in Appendix B. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Public Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Asset Betas during Credit Crisis
Period

This table compares the pension asset allocation, return assumption, and pension asset beta between preand postcrisis periods. A Wilcoxon two-sample test is used to compare the medians. The year 2009 is
identified as credit crisis period. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Precrisis (2001 to 2008)

Postcrisis (2009)

Difference (post – pre)

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

EQUITIES

0.5706

0.5830

0.5059

0.5224

–0.0647***

–0.0606***

FIXED_INCOME

0.2898

0.2720

0.2777

0.2670

–0.0121

–0.0050

REAL_ESTATE

0.0521

0.0490

0.0642

0.0590

0.0121**

0.0100**

ALTERNATIVES

0.0251

0.0000

0.0551

0.0233

0.0300***

0.0233***

CASH_OTHER_ASSETS

0.0623

0.0440

0.0951

0.0810

0.0328***

0.0370***

PENSION_ASSET_BETA

0.0066

0.6735

0.0063

0.6372

–0.0003***

–0.0363***

RETURN_ASSUMPTION

0.0798

0.0800

0.0794

0.0800

–0.0004
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0.0000

Figure 1: The Average Pension Plan Assets Investment Return Assumption and
Five-Year Actual Investment Returns from 2001 to 2009

NOTE: This figure plots the annual average pension plan assets assumed investment returns and actual
investment returns from 2001 and 2009. The data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011). The full sample is from 2001 to 2009, with
1,134 pension system–year observations for 50 states and the District of Columbia.
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Figure 2: The Aggregate Market Value of Pension Assets and Actuarial Funding
Ratios from 2001 to 2009

NOTE: This figure plots the annual aggregate pension assets market value and actuarial funding ratios
from 2001 and 2009. The right vertical axis shows aggregate pension asset market value (in $ bil) and the
left shows the actuarial funding ratios. The data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2011). The full sample is from 2001 to 2009, with
1,134 pension system–year observations for 50 states and the District of Columbia. The pension plan
actuarial funding ratio is estimated as the ratio of actuarial pension assets over actuarial pension liabilities,
as in Equation (2a).
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Figure 3: The Annual Average Pension Assets Allocation and Asset Beta from 2001
to 2009

NOTE: This figure plots the annual average pension asset allocation and pension asset beta from 2001 and
2009. The data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD), obtained from the Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College (2011). The full sample is from 2001 to 2009, with 1,134 pension system–year
observations for 50 states and the District of Columbia. The right vertical axis shows the percentage of
each asset class in the total fund assets, and the left shows pension asset beta. Pension asset beta is
estimated as the weighted average beta of all asset classes in a pension fund, as in Equation (1).
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